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Abstract 
This paper examines the combined impact of the employment guarantee for graduates and 
public sector compensation policies on the Egyptian labor market. Besides contributing to an 
unsustainable rate of growth in the government labor force, these policies encouraged queuing 
for government jobs and contributed to high graduate unemployment rates, and reduced 
graduate employment in the private sector. Despite substantial wage erosion in the public 
sector in recent years, government wages, when appropriately corrected for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity, are on par with private sector wages, especially for graduates. 
When combined with the more attractive non-wage aspects of government jobs, these 
compensation levels explain the attractiveness of public sector employment to graduates. 
Government pay scales are especially advantageous to female secondary school graduates who 
appear to face strong discriminatory barriers in the private sector. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
While the topic of public-private wage differentials has been studied 
extensively in both developed and developing country contexts, the issue takes on 
special importance in Egypt because of the long-standing policy of guaranteeing 
employment in the public sector for all graduates of secondary and post-secondary 
institutions.' When the policy was first instituted in the early 1960's, its impact was 
relatively limited because of the small numbers of eligible graduates, but, over the 
long-teen, it has had major consequences for the Egyptian labor market and economy. 
The employment guarantee fueled the growth in the demand for secondary and 
university education, which the government has struggled to meet, often at the 
expense of the quality of education at all levels. The growth in the number of 
graduates has in turn translated into rapid growth in public sector employment and in 
the number of aspirants to such employment. When the growth of the public sector 
wage bill became unsustainable in the early 1980s, the government responded by 
eroding real public sector wages and extending the waiting period for government 
jobs. Long queues for government jobs indicate that despite wage erosion, rents 
received by public sector workers have not dissipated. These jobs offer lifetime job 
security and generous benefits; attributes that are difficult to obtain in the private 
sector because of lax enforcement of labor laws. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
expectations of effort and performance and tolerance of moonlighting have adjusted 
to at least partially counteract the erosion of public sector wages. While comparisons 
of average wage trends indicate substantial reductions in the public-private wage ratio 
in Egypt (Zaytoun, 1991), this study shows that, once corrected for observed and 
unobserved worker heterogeneity, monetary wages in the government in 1988 were 
lower than in private sector for men but substantially higher for women. As the 
educational level of the worker increases, there is greater parity in wages between the 
two sectors. Since the non-pecuniary aspects of the job are substantially better in the 
government, however, even male government workers are likely to be receiving 
positive rents. Public enterprise workers are better paid than government workers 
and, since they receive similar non-wage benefits, their rents are even higher. 
Since the public sector is a major employer of graduates, these compensation 
policies have a major impact on the employment and compensation of graduates in 
the rest of the economy. I present a Harris-Todaro-type model that predicts the major 
features of the market for educated labor in Egypt, namely queuing for public sector 
jobs, leading to unemployment rates that are three to five times higher among 
1 For a review of the literature on public-private wage differentials in the U.S. and 
Canada see Ehrenberg and Schwartz (1986) and Gunderson (1978). Studies in a 
developing country context include Bennell (1981), Lindauer and Sabot (1983), 
Psacharopoulos (1983), Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988), Stlecner, Van der Gaag, 
and Vijverberg (1989), Al-Qudsi (1989), Terrell (1993). 
graduates than non-graduates, and reduced employment of graduates in the private 
sector. 
While graduates are over-remunerated in this economy in a static sense, the 
resulting excess demand for secondary and higher education, and the lowering of 
educational quality to meet such demand, results in comparatively low rates of return 
to education in Egypt by international standards. Moreover, in contrast to the findings 
of Psacharopoulos and others that rates of return to education are generally higher in 
the competitive sector than in the uncompetitive sector because of the presumed 
equalization of pay scales in the latter (Psacharopoulos, 1983), I find that rates of 
return to secondary education in Egypt are higher in the public sector than in the 
private sector. The secondary level is the lowest level for which a worker can qualify 
for the government employment guarantee and thus gain access to public sector rents. 
We would therefore expect that the greatest glut of graduates and the highest 
reductions in competitive returns to occur at that threshold level. 
In section 1, I review the history and the mode of operation of the graduate 
employment guarantee scheme, highlighting changes in the size of the program and 
the resulting job queue that it engendered. In section 2, 1 examine the effects of the 
policy on the size and composition of the public sector labor force and its budgetary 
consequences. In Section 3, the implications of the policy for open unemployment 
are reviewed. Finally. in Section 4, 1 present the main findings of the paper on the 
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selection into wage work and into the public and private sectors. I end the section by 
attempting to quantify the non-wage benefits of a public sector job in order to obtain a 
more complete picture of relative compensation in each sector. 
2. THE EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE FOR GRADUATES 
2.1 Historical Background: 
As part of the extensive nationalization drive of 1961/62, the Egyptian 
government initiated a major public employment drive which included an 
employment guarantee to university graduates. In 1964, the guarantee was extended 
to vocational secondary school and technical institute graduates and the public 
employment drive was formalized in Law No. 14 of 1964 and was made permanent in 
Law No. 85 of 1973.2 The expansion of the program to secondary school and 
2 This law also extended the employment guarantee to demobilized military conscripts 
of all educational levels. This provision was abrogated in 1976 (Hansen and Radwan, 
1982: 45). The role of the Ministry of Manpower and Training in administering the 
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technical institute graduates was very significant since, together, they constitute about 
two-thirds of eligible graduates. 
The employment guarantee followed a period of rapid expansion in the 
number of graduates from all levels of education.3 Primary education expanded from 
one million students in 1952 to nearly 3.5 million in 1965/66, a rate just under 9 
percent per year (Richards, 1992: 8). Preparatory and secondary enrollments 
expanded even faster, multiplying six-fold and three-fold, respectively in the period 
from 1956 to 1961. While the expansion underscored the commitment of the Nasser 
regime to making educational opportunities more accessible to the mass of the 
population, it had devastating effects on educational quality. Despite rapid growth of 
enrollments, the education system was starved of resources due to major increases in 
military spending and the demands of the state-led import substitution drive (Ibid.). 
In an attempt to substitute for the large number of expatriate technicians who 
left the country after the Suez Crisis in 1956, the government greatly expanded access 
to higher education, whose enrollment increased from 50,000 in 1952/53 to 97,000 in 
1961/62. Combined with the abolition of fees for higher education institutions in 
1963, the employment guarantee for graduates provided a major boost to the demand 
for education. The guaranteed employment greatly enhanced the private benefits of 
university education and the abolition of fees significantly lowered private costs 
(Richards, 1992: 8-9). 
2.2 The Operation of the Employment Guarantee Scheme: 
With the exception of medical graduates and teachers, whose assignment is 
the responsibility of the relevant ministries, the law extends the right to graduates to 
apply to the Ministry of Manpower and Vocational Training for a public sector job. 
employment guarantee is spelled out in Circular Letter No. 43 of the Central Agency 
for Organization and Administration. 
3 The primary education system consists of five years of primary education 
(previously six) and three years of preparatory education. Diplomas from these two 
levels are classified as the "below intermediate" level of educational attainment in 
Egyptian statistical sources. Secondary education is divided into a three-year general 
track that leads into the higher education system and a three-year, and in a limited 
number of cases five-year, vocational track, whose graduates constitute the bulk of 
labor market entrants at the secondary level. Vocational secondary schools are further 
divided into industrial, commercial, and agricultural, and teacher-training tracks. 
Secondary school diplomas are classified as the "intermediate" level of educational 
attainment. The tertiary level of education consists of universities and other higher 
education institutions granting bachelors degrees and masters degrees (classified as 
"university degrees and above") and two-year post-secondary technical institutes 
(classified as "above intermediate"). See Sanyal et at. (1982) and World Bank (1989) 
for a more detailed description of the Egyptian education system. 
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In addition to receiving the graduates' applications, the Ministry solicits requests for 
graduates from government agencies and state-owned enterprises. There was no 
incentive for these agencies to limit their requests since each appointee came with a 
budgetary allocation. Nonetheless, the requests consistently fell short of the number 
of applicants. The ratio of applicants to requests was 1.2 in 1977 and rose to 5.1 in 
1981 (Fergany, 1991 a). Excess supplies of applicants were usually allocated to local 
authorities to dispose of at their discretion (Hansen and Radwan, 1982: 44). Until 
1978, with few exceptions, public agencies and enterprises were not allowed to hire 
permanent workers outside this centralized manpower allocation system. However, 
many agencies circumvented this restriction by hiring workers on temporary 
contracts. In 1978, public enterprises were allowed to opt out of the centralized 
manpower allocation scheme, to set their own hiring levels, and select their own 
workers. Thus, the brunt of the employment guarantee fell on the government sector, 
which includes the central government ministries, local government authorities, and 
the service and economic authorities. The term government will be used hereafter to 
refer to the civil service component of the public sector. 
In the twenty-year period, from the time the graduate guarantee scheme was 
opened to secondary school graduates until the early 1980's when severe budgetary 
pressures resulting from a decline in oil revenues began to manifest themselves, the 
burden of the employment guarantee scheme on the public sector expanded 
significantly. The number of eligible secondary school and technical institute 
graduates increased from 26 thousand in 1966/67 to 213 thousand in 1983 and the 
number of eligible university graduates grew from 13 thousand in 1963/64 to 105 
thousand in 1983.4 This implies an annual growth rate of about 12 percent, compared 
to an overall rate of growth of the labor force during that period of 2.2 percent. 
When the guaranteed employment for graduates was fully implemented in 1963/64, 
graduates constituted about 17 percent of the annual increment to the labor force. By 
1983, they made up 77 percent of that increment. This dramatic increase in the public 
sector's employment creation burden had clearly become unsustainable, but, for 
political reasons, the government felt it could not abolish the program outright. Two 
main courses of actions were pursued. The first was to gradually alter the rate of 
growth and composition of graduates through direct rationing of enrollments by the 
Ministry of Education, and the second was to gradually increase the waiting period 
for a government appointment in the hope that some graduates would drop out of the 
queue. 
According to data from the Ministry of Manpower, the policy aiming at 
limiting enrollments has succeeded in significantly reducing the rate of growth in the 
number of graduates. As shown in Table 1, the number of university graduates 
peaked at about 130 thousand per year in 1986 and has been declining or stable since 
then. The decline has been across all specializations except for Law and teacher's 
training. While the total number of vocational secondary school graduates has 
4 CAPMAS Statistical Yearbook for 1963/64 and 1966/67 data, and Ministry of 
Manpower and Vocational Training for 1989/90. 
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continued to grow, albeit at a slower rate than before, the mix has strongly shifted 
away from the commercial track toward the industrial track. This is the result of 
concerted efforts by the Ministry of Education to adjust the mix in favor of the 
industrial track by building more of the substantially more expensive industrial 
secondary schools. 5 Since post-secondary technical institutes are a relatively recent 
addition to the Egyptian education system, their enrollments were allowed to continue 
growing rapidly, at a rate of 12 percent per year until 1987, but then slowed to 3 
percent per year from 1987 to 1991. The mix has also shifted significantly in favor of 
industrial specializations. 
The second policy response of extending the waiting period for government 
appointments has created a queue for government jobs from which appointments are 
made primarily on the basis of time spent in the queue. By law, university graduates 
must wait two years after graduation and secondary school and technical institute 
graduates three years after graduation to apply to the Ministry of Manpower for a 
government job.' By the 1984, the period between graduation and appointment had 
been extended to three and a half years for university graduates and 4 years for 
vocational secondary and technical institute graduates and, by 1987, to 5 and 6 years, 
respectively (Handoussa, 1989). Hiring through the centralized manpower allocation 
system of Ministry of Manpower is currently on hold but has not been formally 
abolished. As of 1995, the last cohorts of graduates to have been offered 
appointments are the 1983 cohort of university graduates and the 1982 cohort of 
vocational secondary and technical institute graduates. As confirmed in the wage 
equation estimates below, this kind of a 'first-come-first-serve' hiring rule results in 
adverse selection into the government as more able graduates drop out of the queue to 
obtain private sector jobs. 
A graduate is classified as unemployed by the Ministry of Manpower at a 
given date if his or her name remains on the registry of applicants at that date. While 
graduates are removed from the registry as a matter of course if they obtain a public 
sector job, many do not give up their position in the queue if they get a private job.7 
Thus graduates classified as unemployed by the Ministry may in fact be working in 
the private sector but remain in the queue to reserve their right to a public sector 
appointment when their turn comes up. Since the remainder of this section is based 
5 A detailed account of the changes in policy toward technical education in Egypt can 
be found in World Bank (1989). 
('The waiting period was designed to allow male graduates to complete their military 
service. With the exception of the period from 1967 to 1973, when conscripts could 
serve indefinitely, the duration of military service is normally on year longer for 
secondary and technical institute graduates than for university graduates. 
7 An attempt to implement this for some formal private sector firms, resulted in a 
mass resignation of graduates from these firms. This episode, which received a lot of 
attention in the Egyptian press, is a strong indication of the value graduates continue 
to attach to public employment. Details are provided in Assaad (1995) and Al-Ahram, 
September 9 and 10, 1992. 
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on Ministry of Manpower data, I will adopt the definition of ̀ unemployment' used by 
the Ministry. This is clearly at odds with the internationally-accepted definition of 
unemployment. The latter is the definition used in the Egyptian Labor Force Sample 
Survey, which is the basis of the discussion of unemployment in subsequent sections 
of this paper. 
As of mid-1995, 36 percent of graduates eligible for the employment 
guarantee who graduated between 1983 and 1991 were classified by the Ministry as 
`unemployed'. As shown in Table 2, `unemployment' rates, defined as the number of 
`unemployed' graduates divided by the total number of graduates, vary substantially 
by level of education, area of specialization, and year of graduation. Because 
appointments had already been made to virtually all 1983 university graduates, their 
`unemployment' rate is only 0.9 percent, but increases steadily to 20 percent for 1991 
graduates. Health professionals and teachers have the lowest `unemployment' rates 
because their appointments are handled directly by the relevant ministries. The next 
lowest rates are among engineers who are in high demand in both the public and 
private sectors.8 
While some specializations among university graduates, such as commerce, 
have rates of `unemployment' in excess of 30 percent, they are still substantially 
lower than those of vocational secondary school graduates, which approach 50 
percent. Unlike university graduates, however, `unemployment' rates among 
vocational secondary graduates have been falling with year of graduation. This could 
mean that recent graduates perceive their chances of getting a job through the 
centralized manpower allocation system to be so low that they are no longer bothering 
to register with the Ministry of Manpower. The drop in `unemployment' rates is 
especially noticeable for graduates from the industrial track who are likely to be more 
employable in the private sector. 
This analysis of Ministry of Manpower data shows that secondary school 
graduates find it much harder than university graduates to get jobs either in the public 
or private sectors outside the employment guarantee scheme and therefore have a 
greater incentive to remain in the job queue. There may clearly be some substitution 
whereby jobs that require only a secondary education are filled by university 
graduates. However, the evidence is fairly convincing that the employment guarantee 
is contributing to the overproduction of low-quality vocational secondary school 
graduates and giving these graduates relatively high job expectations. The message 
that the government does not intend to maintain its commitment seems to be getting 
through, however, as indicated by the increasing number of drop outs among recent 
secondary school graduates. 
While the Ministry of Manpower data on graduates are not disaggregated by 
gender, there is considerable indirect evidence to indicate that women are much less 
K This is confirmed by the large wage premia they receive in both sectors as shown 
below. 
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likely to drop out from the queue than men. Unemployment rates for female graduates 
are typically significantly higher than those of male graduates (Fergany, 1991b: 130- 
132; also see section 4 below). Moreover, as will be shown below, women's share of 
government employment has increased significantly. This is due in large part to the 
relatively egalitarian treatment of men and women in public sector wage setting 
compared to the large gender wage gap that exists in the private sector (see Section 5 
below). 
3. THE EFFECTS OF THE EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME ON 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Having to absorb a large and growing number of workers every year has 
clearly had a devastating effect on public sector finances, performance, and on its size 
relative to the rest of the economy. Despite the abandonment of the socialist 
development path in 1973, public sector employment growth continued unabated in 
the 1970s, driven primarily by the guaranteed employment scheme. The extension of 
the employment guarantee to demobilized recruits from 1973 to 1976 further 
contributed to this growth, but it was also driven by the expansion of public coffers as 
a result of the oil windfall of the second half of the 1970s. 
3.1 Employment and Wages in the Government: 
While it is difficult to reconcile the various sources of data on the exact size of 
government employment, it appears to have mirrored the fluctuations in the Egyptian 
economy but generally growing at rates significantly higher than those for the overall 
labor force. According to Ministry of Finance data, government employment grew at 
a rate of 6.9 percent per year from 1960 to 1966/67, the height of the socialist phase. 
The growth rate then declined to 5.5 percent per year during the war period (1967- 
1973) as resources had to be diverted to the military buildup. It accelerated to 7.2 
percent per year from 1973 to 1982 even though the government was committed to a 
more market-oriented path. While the growth of government employment was 
somewhat slower than the growth in the number of graduates, it was clearly driven by 
it and by the fact that, in the 1970s, the government had access to sufficient resources 
to hire them. When the oil windfall began to disappear around 1982, the government 
employment growth rate declined again to 5.1 percent per year from 1982/83 to 
1986/7.`' 
Table 3 shows employment levels by sector from 1981 to 1992 as reported in 
the Labor Force Sample Survey (CAPMAS). Because of vastly different data 
collection methodologies, these data should not be compared directly to Ministry of 
Finance data. However, they can provide some indication about government 
`' See Handoussa (1989) for a discussion of the discrepancy between Ministry of 
Finance data and other data sources. It appears that the Ministry of Finance data is 
exaggerating the growth of the government labor force in the latter part of the period. 
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employment trends since 1981.10 The LFSS confirms that government employment 
was growing rapidly from 1981 to 1984 (8.4 percent per year), slowed down 
considerably between 1984 and 1992 (4 percent per year). The share of government 
in total employment appears to have stabilized somewhere between 23 and 24 
percent. 
Real government wages appear to have risen during the boom period of the 
1970s and early 1980s, but then dropped precipitously thereafter, as the government 
attempted to bring its finances under control. According to Zaytoun (1991: 250), real 
government wages rose to a peak of 19 percent above their 1974 level in 1981, but by 
1986 had fallen by nearly 40 percent of their 1981 level. While more recent data on 
government wages are not readily available, real wages have probably continued to 
decline since cost of living adjustments have been kept well below the inflation rate, 
by agreement with the IMF. Such a dramatic decline in real government wages has 
undoubtedly had a devastating effect on the quality of government services through 
reduced morale, increased moonlighting, and increased graft. 
Despite the slowdown in government hiring and the erosion of real wages, the 
share of wages in the government budget has increased from 21 percent to 26 percent 
between 1983/84 and 1988/89, after a period where it was relatively stable at 22 
percent from 1979 to 1983/84. While other expenditures, such as subsidies have been 
brought under control to comply with the IMF stabilization program, it has proven 
more difficult to cut the government wage bill. 
3.2 Employment in Public Enterprise: 
No comprehensive series of public enterprise employment is available for the 
period 1960 to 1975, but llandoussa (1989) concludes that it grew at a rate of 8.7 
percent per year from 1960 to 1966 and 2.9 percent from 1966 to 1976. Zaytoun 
(1991: 244) provides data on public enterprise employment from 1974 to 1986/87. 
That series suggests that employment has grown by about 5 percent per year from 
1974 to 1979 and then slowed down to 1.4 percent per year from 1979 to 1986/87. 
The policy change to allow public enterprise to opt out of the centralized manpower 
allocation scheme would have become effective by 1979. The more recent data from 
the Labor Force Sample Survey shown in Table 2 does not reveal any upward trend in 
public enterprise employment. 
10 Total employment in the October 1988 round of the survey is not comparable to 
total employment in other years because a special effort was made to detect female 
employment in agricultural and informal activities. See Fergany (1991b) for an 
explanation of the discrepancy. 
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3.3 The Composition of Public Sector Employment: 
In addition to its effect on overall government employment and wages, the 
guaranteed employment scheme has skewed the composition of public sector 
employment toward more graduates, most of whom are white collar workers. It has 
also contributed to an increasing feminization of the government labor force because 
of the higher likelihood that female graduates will remain in the job queue. 
As shown in Table 4, nearly 70 percent of government employees are 
graduates. Among female employees, the proportion of graduates is nearly 95 
percent. Graduates constitute 47 percent of the labor force in public enterprise. In 
contrast, they constitute less than 4.5 percent of employment in agriculture and less 
than 20 percent of employment in the private non-agricultural sector. 
Even though the participation of public enterprise in the employment 
guarantee scheme ended in 1978, the legacy of the scheme remains with them. In 
discussions surrounding public enterprise restructuring and privatization, enterprise 
leaders stressed on a number of occasions that clerical and administrative workers 
constituted their most serious surplus labor problem. 
The increasing feminization of the government labor force can be readily seen 
from Table 5, which is based on a comparison of census data from 1976 and 1986. 
Female employment in the government has grown at a rate of 8.7 percent per year. 
The government sector alone was responsible for 76 percent of female employment 
growth compared to about one third of male employment growth. Finally, women 
made up nearly one half of the increase in government employment over the period. 
4. THE EFFECT OF THE EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE ON 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
For a country where it is virtually impossible to get unemployment benefits, 
Egypt's open unemployment rate of 7 to 10 percent is relatively high. Most of this 
open unemployment involves graduates and can be attributed to the cumulative effect 
of the graduate guarantee scheme. While there is some seasonal unemployment 
among agricultural workers, most open unemployment is due to graduates waiting 
their turn in the government employment queue. As shown in Table 6, while 
unemployment rates among uneducated workers (the illiterate and read and write 
categories) fluctuate between 0.3 and 2.6 percent, unemployment rates among 
graduates are fairly stable and considerably higher. Consistent with the patterns 
detected from the records of the Ministry of Manpower, unemployment rates among 
graduates are highest among intermediate level (secondary school) graduates and 
lowest among university graduates. In most of the years shown, graduates make up 
over 90 percent of the unemployed. 
Disaggregated by sex, unemployment data reveal that female graduates are 
disproportionately represented among the unemployed. In 1992, women made up 50 
9 
percent of unemployed graduates but only 25 percent of employed graduates. Among 
secondary school graduates, the female unemployment rate was 46 percent as 
compared to 22 percent for their male counterparts. The rate for female university 
graduates is lower (20 percent) but still considerably higher than that of males at that 
level (12 percent). These results confirm that female vocational secondary school 
graduates, most of whom pursue the commercial track, are the least able to find 
acceptable employment outside the government. 
To conclude, unemployment data suggest that the sharp increase in open 
unemployment in Egypt since the early 1980s is primarily a manifestation of the 
adjustment needed as a result of the curtailment of the primary labor absorption 
mechanism for graduates in the Egyptian economy, namely government employment. 
The graduates themselves need to adjust their expectations to the kind of work 
available in the private sector, namely jobs with little job security, few benefits, and 
higher effort requirements. While it appears that the erosion of public sector wages 
and the length of the government job queue may finally be enticing male graduates to 
find alternative employment in the private sector, this is not yet the case for female 
graduates for whom the government is increasingly becoming the employer of last 
resort. The problem is particularly acute for vocational secondary school graduates 
who make up nearly two thirds of female applicants. Women with vocational 
secondary degrees seem to face substantial discrimination in the private labor market. 
While males with vocational secondary degrees earn about the same in public and 
private sectors, females face a public-private wage differential of 40 to 60 percent, not 
counting all the non-monetary benefits of a public sector job (see Table 10). It is 
therefore not surprising that they have a strong preference for public sector jobs. 
5. THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC WAGE SETTING POLICIES ON WAGE 
DETERMINATION AND RETURNS TO EDUCATION 
The combination of the employment guarantee for graduates and wage setting 
policies in the public sector have had a profound but complex effect on the structure 
of wages in the Egyptian economy. The non-market determination of public sector 
wages, combined with the substantial size of public sector employment, distorts 
wages in the private sector in two ways. First, by setting a floor for the wages and 
other benefits of those covered by the employment guarantee, the policy reduces the 
employment of graduates in the private sector by artificially raising the cost of their 
labor relative to that of others. Even if public sector jobs are not readily obtainable, 
the expected public sector wage (or anticipated discounted lifetime earnings and 
benefits) is still higher than in the private sector, thus encouraging graduates to queue 
for public sector jobs. Second, a public sector wage floor for graduates artificially 
inflates the demand for secondary and university education relative to other levels, 
leading to a shift of educational resources to these levels. The resulting increase in 
the supply of graduates pushes down the market clearing wage in the private sector 
below what it would have been without the wage floor. 
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5.1 A Simple Supply and Demand Model for Educated Labor: 
The effect of the policy can be readily analyzed using a simplified Harris- 
Todaro type model as follows. Consider the model shown in Figure 1. Let SS be the 
supply curve of educated labor without the policy and DD the private sector demand 
for this labor. Government employment adds a fixed amount to labor demand shifting 
the demand curve to D'D'. If both the public and private sectors paid the market 
clearing wage, the wage would be w private employment would be L , , and total 
employment would be LT . There would be no graduate unemployment. Assume 
instead that government wage setting practices are such that wages are set at W above 
the market clearing wage w*. Assume that each graduate has a probability p of 
receiving the government wage 7, the prevailing wage in the private sector will be 
the expected wage w,, = pW. The probability of employment p is assumed to depend 
on the number of unemployed graduates L,, (or the length of the queue for 
government jobs) as follows: p = f(L,,), where f(O) = 1 and f'(L) < 0; 0 <_ p<_ 1. 
w,, will fall on the intersection of the curve EE and the supply curve. While We can 
be above or below w * , the interesting case is when w, > w * . At that wage, private 
sector employment of graduates will decline to LP and unemployment will be L;, . 
Public sector employment is assumed to be invariant to the wage. 
If the increased demand for education at the secondary and university levels 
prompts the government to shift resources to these levels, the supply curve will shift 
outward. In that case the market clearing would be now be x1* < w * and the new 
prevailing wage will be w,',. Since it is not clear whether we will be above or below 
the original market clearing wage w * , we cannot say whether the policy increases or 
reduces graduate wages and the private returns to education. 
As indicated in earlier sections, the Egyptian labor market exhibits all the 
features predicted by this simple model: there is a queue of unemployed graduates 
waiting for government appointments and private sector employment of graduates is 
very limited. However, a direct comparison of public and private wages does not 
support the idea of a public sector wage floor. Average wages in the public sector 
appear to be substantially lower than in the private sector and have lagged further 
behind inflation in recent years. However, once wages are corrected for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity, and the difference of non-pecuniary benefits is taken into 
account, the attraction of public sector jobs to graduates becomes readily apparent. 
This exercise is carried out below. 
5.2 Wage Setting in the Government: 
Wage setting in the Egyptian government has been driven by non-market 
considerations since well before the institution of the graduate employment guarantee. 
The "Law of the Price List of Educational Certificates" of 1951 stipulated a fixed 
initial salary for each educational certificate and a system of periodic increments 
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according to seniority and level of education, regardless of the position occupied. 
Basic wages in the government are still being set in this manner. Compensation levels 
are tied to job grades, with lower and upper bounds for each grade set according to a 
unified schedule. Each year the worker is entitled to a periodic increase so long as the 
resulting wage does not exceed the maximum for the grade. In addition to the basic 
wages, workers can receive allowances for hazardous work, accommodation, and 
various other aspects of the job. The employing agency can also pay incentives for 
good performance. The sum total of allowances and incentives is limited to 100 
percent of the basic wage.' I 
In practice, the vast majority of employees are rated Distinguished or Very 
Good in their performance evaluation, irrespective of their performance. It appears 
that government managers and supervisors have little incentive to do otherwise and 
can suffer considerable grief from their subordinates and colleagues for "unduly" 
penalizing a worker. Incentive payments are usually made on a uniform basis 
throughout a particular agency, but important differences can be found among 
agencies (See Zaytoun, 1991). 
5.3 Wage Equation Estimates: 
5.3.1 Methodology 
I estimate wage equations for males and females using a standard Mincerian 
human capital model where variations in wages are assumed to be based on 
differences in educational attainment and on-the-job experience. Regional variables 
are included to control for differences in cost of living and labor market conditions. 
Since public sector wages are not necessarily set to equal marginal productivity as 
assumed in the Mincerian approach, I distinguish between the two sectors by allowing 
each to have its own wage-determination process. 12 A number of other studies have 
attempted to investigate public/private wage differentials in developing countries 
(Lindauer and Sabot, 1983, Corbo and Stlecner, 1983, Psacharopoulos, 1983, Al- 
Qudsi, 1989). These studies do not take into consideration the endogeneity of the 
sector allocation process as is done in some of the more recent studies (Van der Gaag 
and Vijverberg, 1988 and Stlecner, Van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1989, Terrell, 
1993). Since in this case data are only available for wage workers, I also need to take 
into account the endogeneity of participation in wage work in a context where self- 
employment is common.' 3 
11 The system is laid out in articles 40 and 41 of the Civil Servants Law (Law 47 of 
1978) and amended in Law 115 of 1983. 
12 The public sector is defined to include the government (or civil service) and the 
public enterprise sector. Everything else is included in the private sector. 
13 Tansel (1994) corrects for selectivity into wage work but does not disaggregate by 
sector. 
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In this study, I limit the analysis to non-agricultural wage workers. I therefore 
take into account selection into non-agricultural wage work and selection into the 
public and private sectors for non-agricultural wage workers. For males, the relevant 
universe for the participation in non-agricultural wage work decision is all males 15 to 
64 who were in the labor force at any time during the reference year. For females, the 
relevant universe for the participation decision is all females 15 to 64, whether or not 
they were in the labor force. I abstract from the issue of selection into the two 
components of the public sector. I assume that the wage determination process in 
public enterprise is identical to that in the government except for a shift parameter. 14 
To model the two simultaneous selection processes, I use a bivariate probit 
double selection framework that extends the single selection procedures developed by 
Heckman (1976, 1979) and Lee (1976) to account for two selection rules jointly 
determining inclusion in a particular subsample (Tunali, 1986). The distribution of 
the error terms of the two selection equations and the two wage equations are 
assumed to be quadrivariate normal. The model and the selection equation 
specification and estimates are presented in the Appendix. 
5.3.2 The Data 
The data are obtained from the October 1988 round of the Egyptian Labor 
Force Sample Survey. This special round of the survey used a much more detailed set 
of questions to inquire about earnings than is usual in similar surveys in Egypt. 15 The 
earnings data are therefore likely to be of considerably higher quality than those 
obtained through other household surveys. While the survey attempted to get data on 
earnings in kind, the quality of that data is quite poor. I therefore use monetary net 
earnings and divide by the number of hours worked per year to compute the hourly 
wage. The most important exclusions from net earnings are the value of retirement 
and death benefits for workers who are covered by social insurance and the value of 
job security for those who possess legal employment contracts. While the vast 
majority of public sector workers have social insurance coverage and work under 
legal employment contracts, this is not the case in the private sector. Among private 
non-agricultural wage workers, only 12 percent have legal contracts and 26 percent 
have social insurance coverage. 16 
14 See TerrelI (1993) for a study that takes into account non-random selection into the 
two components of the public sector. I also do not take into account endogenous 
selection into different levels of education. See Willis and Rosen (1979) for a 
discussion of the issues involved. 
15 The earnings module was designed by Professor Mohaya Zaytoun and is described 
in detail in Zaytoun (1990). 
16 See Assaad (1995) for a description of Egypt's job security and social insurance 
system. 
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Summary statistics for the variables used in the wage equations are shown in 
Table 7. The sample is limited to individuals between the ages of 15 and 64." 
Nearly 38 percent of males in the overall sample are non-agricultural wage workers, 
and among those nearly 60 percent are in the public sector. The proportion of females 
in non-agricultural wage work is much lower at about 10 percent, but the share of the 
public sector among them is significantly higher than for males (77 percent). 
The attractiveness of public sector work for females can be readily understood 
if one examines the wage data. While there is a large gap between the average male 
and female wage in the private sector, there is near parity in the public sector. As 
shown below, the relative gender gap between the two sectors does not disappear 
when worker characteristics are taken into account. 
Female non-agricultural wage workers in both sectors are generally better 
educated than their male counterparts. Eighty one percent hold a secondary diploma 
or above and 26 percent hold a university diploma, compared to 43 and 16 percent for 
mnales, respectively. Holders of secondary and post-secondary degrees are also 
disproportionately represented in the public sector for both sexes. They constitute 54 
percent and 91 percent of the public sector workforce for males and females 
respectively, compared to 27 percent and 49 percent of private non-agricultural wage 
workers. Finally, with the public sector, 34 percent of male workers and 16 percent 
of female workers work in public enterprise, with the remainder in the government. 
5.3.3 Specification and Estimation 
Separate equations are estimated for males and females. Experience is 
calculated as the total number of years since entry into the labor force, thus neglecting 
any time spent outside the labor force since entry. Since the number of years of 
schooling is not available from the survey, education is specified as the attainment of 
particular educational credentials. 18 
I present wage equation estimates for all non-agricultural wage workers as 
well as disaggregated by 19 The first set of estimates is corrected for selectivity 
into non-agricultural wage work, while the second is corrected for double selection 
into non-agricultural wage work and into the public or private sectors. Since several 
previous studies have shown that wage-experience profiles are steeper for educated 
17 In addition, the male sample is limited to a randomly selected subsample of 
approximately half the households for which data on parents' employment status were 
collected. 
'x The "read and write" variable is clearly an exception to this rule. See van der Gaag 
and V i jverberg (1989) for an comparison of the credentials approach and the years of 
schooling approach. 
19 The specification and estimation of the selection equations are discussed in the 
Appendix. 
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workers (Knight and Sabot, 1981), I present two alternative specifications of the 
experience-education interaction. The first, referred to as Model (1) in the various 
tables, assumes no interaction exists between education and experience, and the 
second, referred to as Model (2), includes interaction terms between experience and 
dummy variables for the main educational levels --primary, secondary and tertiary.20 
1 assume that the wage formation process in public enterprise is similar to the 
government's, except for a shift parameter, which is the parameter of the public 
enterprise dummy variable in the public sector equation. 
The wage equation estimates are shown in Table 8 for males and Table 9 for 
females. Predicted wages by experience and education level are shown in Table 10.21 
A comparison of the results from models (1) and (2) in Tables 8 and 9 reveals that 
there is a significant education-experience interaction in the expected direction. I will 
therefore focus on the interpretation of estimates from model (2). Model (1) estimates 
are provided to allow for comparison with the majority of estimates provided in the 
literature. 
The sector-specific equations reveal that there are distinct wage setting 
mechanisms in the public and private sectors.22 For men, the main differences in 
wage setting between the two sectors appears to be in the returns to education for 
levels of educational attainment above the primary level, which are considerably 
higher in the public sector. Only engineers have similar returns to their education in 
the two sectors. For women, the primary difference besides differences in the 
constant appears to be in the return to university education, which are higher in the 
private sector, and in the regional dummies. 
The sample selection terms confirm the hypothesis that the job queue results 
in adverse selection into the government, but show no evidence of non-random 
selection into non-agricultural wage work. The coefficient of the wage work sample 
selection term is either statistically insignificant or switches signs between 
specifications. The coefficient of the public-private selection term, however, is 
20In this context, "primary" includes both primary and preparatory certificates, 
"secondary" includes vocational secondary, general secondary, and technical institute 
diplomas, and "tertiary" includes baccalaureate and post-baccalaureate degrees. The 
reference category is "no certificate" which includes illiterates and those who can 
only read and write. The three education level dummy variables are interacted only 
with the linear experience term. The interactions with the quadratic term were jointly 
insignificant. 
21 The predicted wages are for a reference worker who lives in Greater Cairo, is not 
currently married and is not a head of household. The reference public sector worker 
is a government employee. 
22 A Chow test rejects equality between the coefficients [F(25,2877)=l 1.12 for the 
male equation and F(25,1483)=4.99 for the female equation]. Equality of the slopes 
is rejected even if the intercepts are allowed to differ [F(23,2877)=5.78 for the male 
equation and F(23,1483)=4.73 for the female equation]. 
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always negative and is significant for both male and female public sector workers 
under the preferred model (2) specification, confirming the hypothesis of negative 
selection into the public sector. 
To further examine the public-private wage differential I use an extension of 
Oaxaca's (1973) decomposition of the wage differential that includes differences due 
to selectivity bias (Idson and Feaster, 1990; Terrell, 1993). 1 decompose the total 
differential in mean wages between the government and the private sector and public 
enterprise and the private sector into four components: (i) a component that is 
explained by differences in observed worker characteristics, (ii) a component due to 
differences in the constant terms, which is sometimes interpreted as the premium or 
pure rent from being in a given sector, (iii) a component that captures differences in 
returns to worker characteristics in the two sectors, and (iv) selectivity bias.23 
Components (ii) and (iii) constitute the unexplained component of the mean wage 
differential. The decomposition is shown in Table 11. In all cases public sector 
workers have a positive and significant differential due to differences in observed 
characteristics because they are in general better educated than private sector workers. 
The unexplained differential between government and private sector male workers is 
negative and statistically significant and is due, for the most part, to a difference in the 
intercept rather than in returns to human capital and other characteristics. This 
differential in favor of the private sector is of the same order of magnitude as the 
lower-bound estimate of the difference in non-pecuniary benefits between the two 
sectors that is derived below (0.37 log points compared to 0.44 log points). Hence 
there is weak evidence, at best, that the average male worker in the government 
receives any rent. The unexplained differential between male public enterprise and 
private sector workers is smaller and statistically insignificant. Since non-pecuniary 
benefits and working conditions in public enterprise are similar to those of the 
government, we can conclude that public enterprise workers do receive rents. 
The situation for females is quite different. Because of the large gender wage 
gap in the private sector and the more equitable wage setting rules in the public 
sector, there is a large positive unexplained differential in favor of both government 
and public enterprise workers. Most of it is due to differences in the constant tern 
rather than in returns to the various characteristics. It is also worth noting the large 
negative selection differential, which captures the adverse selection of females into 
the public sector. 
To investigate the variation in the wage differential by educational level and 
experience, I present, in Figure 2, wage-experience profiles for government and 
private sector workers for selected educational levels. For illiterate males (Panel a), 
measured wages are significantly higher in the private sector than in the government 
23 
1 use a decomposition'similar to Terrell's (1993): 
yP -Y,, =05(Qr +/3R)(X,, -XR)±(f3 . -130,,)+0.5(X,, +X,)(/3i> -8u) 
+[PI P6P' 1P + P2P6 P72P -PIR6R.IR -P2R6 RX2RJ 
where a bar denotes sample means. The symbols are defined in the Appendix. 
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over most of the relevant range of experience, with the gap increasing at first and then 
declining at higher levels of experience. An illiterate male with 15 years of 
experience earns 70 percent more in the private sector than in the government 
(computed from Table 10). The pattern is reversed for illiterate females. Government 
wages, exclusive of benefits, are significantly higher than private sector wages over 
the entire range of experience. These results highlight once more the large gender 
wage gap that exists for illiterates in the private sector. Within the government, there 
is an apparent gender wage gap in favor of females for illiterate workers but the 
difference is well within the standard error of the constant term in the public sector 
equation for females. 
Panel b shows the wage-experience profiles of white collar vocational 
secondary school graduates, who make up the bulk of graduates at the secondary 
level. For males, government and private sector wages are similar. A small gap in 
favor of the private sector develops for intermediate levels of experience, but narrows 
later as the effect of seniority-based wage setting rules in the government becomes 
more pronounced. For females there is a large and growing wage gap in favor of the 
government over most of the relevant experience range, underscoring the strong 
preference female vocational secondary school graduates have for public sector work. 
For university graduates, differences between males and females and between 
the government and the private sector are much smaller (Panel c). Entry wages are 
similar in both sectors but a differential in favor of the private sector develops with 
experience. 
Engineers receive a positive wage premium in both sectors, but the premium is 
significantly smaller in the government and is not significant for females. This 
suggests that the government has a limited ability to pay higher wages for professions 
that are in high demand in the private sector. 
To conclude, the wage equation estimates indicate that while private sector 
wages are higher than government wages for males at all education levels, the 
premium received by private sector workers is probably insufficient to compensate 
them for the difference in non-wage benefits and working conditions. Since public 
enterprise workers are paid more than their government counterparts and receive 
similar benefits, they receive an even higher rent. For females, government wages 
exceed those in the private sector at all levels of education up to the university level. 
Faced with a large gender wage gap in the private sector and egalitarian wage-setting 
in the public sector, female with less than a university degree will clearly have a 
strong preference for the public sector. Those with a university education appear to 
face fewer discriminatory barriers in the private sector. 
17 
5.4 Returns to Education: 
Using the wage equation estimates discussed above, I compute private rates of 
return to schooling by sector and sex. Because of the large differences in benefits, 
job security, and work effort required in the public and private sectors, monetary 
compensation in the two sectors cannot be compared directly. Rates of return to 
schooling that do not disaggregate by sector are essentially comparing lifetime 
income streams for educated workers who are much more likely to be working in the 
public sector to those of workers with less schooling, who are much more likely to be 
found in the private sector. Since public sector jobs have significantly higher non- 
pecuniary benefits, this has the effect of reducing overall rates of return to schooling. 
To get around this problem, I calculate sector-specific rates of return to schooling, by 
comparing lifetime streams of income for workers in the same sector at different 
levels of schooling. Subject to the assumption that the non-pecuniary benefits of a 
public sector job do not vary by schooling level, this gets over the limitation of non- 
comparable compensation packages. However, because a given individual may be 
making a choice over a job in the private sector at the lower level of education and 
one in the public sector at the higher level, keeping the comparison within one sector 
may not accurately reflect the choice set. 
In computing rates of return to schooling, I assume that the direct costs of 
schooling are insignificant compared to the income foregone while in school and that 
the duration for which income is forgone is equal to the duration of the additional 
schooling. While the first assumption is relatively unproblematic, the second one 
may not correspond to reality. Since graduates are much more likely to be 
unemployed at entry than non-graduates and, when unemployed, have longer 
unemployment duration, one would need to include such excess unemployment in the 
rate of return to schooling calculation. The likely effect of such an adjustment would 
be to reduce rates of return to secondary schooling and increase rates of return to 
university schooling because secondary school graduates face higher levels of 
unemployment than either university graduates or primary school graduates. 
Private rates of return to schooling with and without disaggregation by sector 
are shown in Table 12. By international standards, rates of return to primary 
schooling are very low in Egypt. Psacharopoulos (1985) reports average private rates 
of return to primary schooling of 45 percent in Africa and 3 1 percent in Asia, 
compared to 1-5 percent for males and 4-10 percent for females in Egypt.24 
Psacharopoulos (1983) also reports that rates of return in the noncompetitive public 
sector tend to be lower than in the competitive private sector because compression of 
pay scales in the public sector flattens mean earnings differentials, and hence 
depresses returns to education. I find the opposite to be true in Egypt up to the 
24111 this study, rates of return to primary schooling are computed assuming only two 
years of income foregone relative to who can just read and write. 
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university level.25 Because of the oversupply of vocational secondary school 
graduates, rates of return to that level of education are either very low or negative in 
both sectors. 
Private returns to schooling at the university level are significantly higher on 
average than at the secondary or primary level and appear to be higher in the private 
sector than in the public sector, lending some credence to Psacharopoulos' wage 
compression hypothesis. The gap between returns to schooling in the private and 
public sectors is largest for engineering graduates, who are highly prized in the 
private sector, but is also large for holders of post-graduate degrees. These patterns 
appear to hold for both males and females. 
5.5 Quantifying the Non-Wage Benefits of a Public Sector Job: 
Besides better benefits and greater job security, there are many reasons why a 
public sector job may be preferred to a private job that pays the same wage. These 
include lower actual numbers of hours worked, access to rents, opportunities for 
moonlighting, access to subsidized commodities and housing, access to free transport, 
etc.. While women are less likely to participate in moonlighting than men, they 
prefer public sector jobs because the lower level of effort and time required males a 
public sector job more compatible with their domestic responsibilities.26 Quantifying 
the value placed on these non-wage benefits is not straightforward. My attempt at 
doing so provides a lower bound subject to some reasonable assumptions. 
Assuming that there is free entry into the private sector, that public sector jobs 
are rationed, and that the non-wage benefits of a public sector job are invariant to, or 
at least do not decline with, increasing levels of education, a lower bound estimate of 
these benefits can be obtained as follows. Assume that illiterate male workers, for 
whom there is the largest wage gap in favor of the private sector receive no rent if 
they work in the public sector. Since there is free entry into the private sector, they 
receive no rent in the private sector either. Thus, the difference between their 
discounted lifetime earnings in the private and public sectors can serve as a lower 
bound for the non-pecuniary value of a government job. 
25 This is clearly the case for males. the results for females are less reliable because 
of the imprecise estimates of the private sector wage equations. 
26 In an interview quoted in the Ahram newspaper, a woman who resigned her job in a 
large private firm when faced the possibility of losing her place in the queue for 
government jobs said: "I want to rest. I have back pain as a result of the many hours 
of work I spend at the sewing machine at the factory. I want a position in the 
government so that I can rest." [Al Ahram, September 10, 19921. Another woman 
interviewed expressed the desire for the government because it would allow her to be 
closer to home so that she can marry and have children. 
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Using the Model (2) estimates of the wage equations, I estimate the net 
present value of the difference in the stream of earnings from a private and a public 
sector job for an illiterate male at a discount rate of 5 percent to be 0.44 log points or 
about 56 percent. It ranges from 0.37 to 0.45 log points for discount rates of 4 to 8 
percent.27 Despite the preliminary nature of these estimates, an appropriate lower 
bound estimate for the non-wage value of a public sector job is approximately 50 
percent of the observed public sector wage. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The employment guarantee for graduates and public sector compensation 
policies have indeed had a major effect on the Egyptian labor market. It contributed 
to an unsustainable rate of growth in the government labor force resulting in a bloated 
bureaucracy and severe overstaffing. By setting a floor for the wages and benefits 
that a graduate can achieve, it encouraged queuing for government jobs, contributing 
to high graduate unemployment rates, and reduced graduate employment in the 
private sector. Despite the de facto suspension of the program since 1990, the 
possibility of a government job continues to drive the labor market expectations of 
graduates. 
The labor market for vocational secondary school and technical institute 
graduates is disproportionately affected by the public hiring and compensation 
policies. Because they have the highest ratio of public to private wages, they are 
more willing to queue for government jobs and therefore have the highest 
unemployment rates. When combined with the non-wage benefits of a public sector 
job, the relative wages for secondary and technical institute graduates in the public 
and private sectors translates into a significant rent for public sector workers. This 
public-private wage gap is particularly large for female vocational secondary school 
graduates, who appear to face severe discriminatory barriers in the private sector. 
Because of wage compression in the public sector, the wage differential between the 
two sectors is less pronounced for university graduates. Wage compression, in effect, 
mitigates the effect of the public sector wage floor for this category of graduates. 
Rates of return to primary and secondary schooling in Egypt are well below 
those in comparable countries, especially in the private sector. At the primary level, 
this is probably due the fact that primary education was starved of resources to 
finance the demand for secondary and higher education generated by the employment 
guarantee scheme, with disastrous consequences for educational quality. While 
educational quality is also a factor at the secondary level, a compounding factor is the 
glut in the number of secondary school graduates that can be directly attributed to the 
employment guarantee scheme and the large public-private wage gap at that level. It 
is at this threshold level that the employment guarantee has its greatest distortionary 
impact on the labor market. 
27 Under model (1), the estimate is even higher at around 0.64 log points. 
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Table 1 - Evolution of the Number of Graduates Eligible for the Employment Guarantee, 1983-91. 




Gr. Rt. (%) 
Health Sciences 9,998 8,754 8,062 6,546 7,230 74,185 2.1 -4.1 
Agriculture 8,194 8,738 7,935 7,247 8,147 72,380 2.1 -1.5 
Commerce 28,441 35,730 35,236 29,051 26,293 282,434 8.1 -1.8 
Engineering 8,575 10,198 9,209 8,163 7,614 78,386 2.3 -2.6 
Sciences 4,370 4,486 4,456 3,864 3,625 37,792 1.1 -2.2 
Law 9,562 13,551 13,394 14,879 17,848 124,308 3.6 6.9 
Teacher's Training 15,688 22,931 24,916 23,304 22,446 203,677 5.9 2.9 
Other Bachelor's Degrees 20,444 26,102 26,103 23,684 27,276 226,886 6.5 1.5 
All University 105,272 130,490 129,311 1 t6-17-38- 120,479 1,100,048 31.7 0.5 
Commercial Technical Institute 17,709 23,512 26,007 26,356 25,993 218,902 6.3 4.7 
Industrial Technical Institute 4,622 4,008 10,405 11,875 13,015 79,022 2.3 19.2 
Other Technical Institute 2,115 2,752 3,120 3,587 5,241 29,202 0.8 10.3 
All Technical Institute 24,446 30,272 39,532 41,818 44,249 327,126 9.4 8.3 
Agric. Vocational Secondary 22,267 23,563 29,228 30,486 35,103 251,107 7.2 5.0 
Commercial Vocational Secondary 107,672 102,696 111,996 126,303 112,898 1,015,129 29.2 0.9 
Industrial Vocational Secondary 58,412 65,108 75,210 108,169 131,472 779,987 22.5 11.4 
All Vocational Secondary 188,351 191,367 216,434 264,958 279,473 2,046,223 58.9 5.4 
All Graduates 318,069 352,129 385,277 423,514 444,201 3,473,397 100.0 4.1 
Source: Ministry of Manpower and Vocational Training 
Table 2 - Proportion of Graduates Classified as Unemployed by the Ministry of Manpower and 
Vocational Training by Educational Level/Specialization and Year of Graduation (%) 
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1983-91 
Health Sciences 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.6 
Agriculture 1.3 33.9 38.2 41.7 48.5 33.3 
Commerce 1.0 18.4 23.1 27.0 32.5 20.4 
Engineering 1.1 6.6 8.4 10.1 14.1 7.8 
Sciences 1.5 22.4 25.0 32.1 38.5 24.1 
Law 1.4 15.3 19.3 23.8 26.7 18.7 
Teacher's Training 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 4.6 1.0 
Other Bachelor's Degrees 1.1 12.7 17.4 20.4 31.1 17.0 
All University 0.9 12.8 15.8 18.5 24.3 14.6 
Commercial Technical Institute 18.4 26.0 34.0 43.5 46.3 35.5 
Industrial Technical Institute 23.5 62.3 36.6 40.9 38.7 41.1 
Other Technical Institute 3.9 8.4 12.1 15.7 10.8 11.6 
All Technical Institute 17.9 28.8 32.5 39.7 39.3 34.2 
Agric. Vocational Secondary 60.6 52.5 48.0 55.2 38.0 50.4 
Commercial Vocational Secondary 42.0 48.7 49.9 52.1 48.0 48.9 
Industrial Vocational Secondary 58.0 51.2 50.5 43.7 29.2 44.4 
All Vocational Secondary 49.2 50.1 49.9 49.0 37.9 47.4 
All Graduates 30.8 34.4 36.6 39.7 34.4 35.8 
Source: Ministry of Manpower and Vocational Training 
Table 3 - Distribution of Employment by Institutional Sector, Ages 12- 64. 
Year Govern- Public Private Other (incl. All 
ment Enterprise joint 
venture, 
foreign, ..) 
'000s 1,980 1,337 6,604 25 9,946 
1981 row % 19.9 13.4 66.4 0.2 100.0 
(May) index, 1984=100 78.41 105.04 86.14 6.96 84.15 
'000s 2,525 1,273 7,667 354 11,819 
1984 row % 21.4 10.8 64.9 3.0 100.0 
(May) index, 1984= 100 100 100 100 100 100 
'000s 2,930 1,314 11,833 188 16,263 
1988 row % 18.0 8.1 72.8 1.2 100.0 
(October) index, 1984=100 116 103 154 53 138 
'000s 3,285 1,515 9,421 140 14,361 
1990 row % 22.9 10.5 65.6 1.0 100.0 
December) index, 1984=100 130 119 123 40 122 
'000s 3,313 1,426 9,574 176 14,489 
1991 row % 22.9 9.8 66.1 1.2 100.0 
(Annual) index, 1984=100 131 112 125 50 123 
'000s 3,479 1,410 9,347 163 14,399 
1992 row % 24.2 9.8 64.9 1.1 100.0 
(Annual) index, 1984=100 138 111 122 46 122 
Source: CAPMAS, LFSS. 
Table 4 - Employment by Institutional Sector and Sex (1976-86) 
Employment Employment Structure Annual 
Sector '000s Growth Rate (%) 
1976 1986 change 1976 1986 change 1976-86 
Government Male 1,511 1,920 409 16.0 18.2 35.9 2.4 
Female 275 657 382 40.7 55.9 76.5 8.7 
Total 1,786 2,577 791 17.7 21.9 48.3 3.7 
% female 15.4 25.5 48.3 
Public Enterprises Male 891 1,085 194 9.4 10.3 17.0 2.0 
Female 74 120 46 10.9 10.2 9.3 4.9 
Total 965 1,205 240 9.5 10.3 14.7 2.2 
% female 7.6 10.0 19,4 
Agriculture Male 4,725 4,408 -317 50.1 41.7 -27.9 -0.7 
Female 156 125 -31 23.0 10.6 -6.2 -2.2 
Total 4,881 4,533 -348 48.3 38.6 -21.3 -0.7 
% female 3.2 2.7 8.9 
Private Non-Agriculture Male 2,303 3,156 853 24.4 29.9 74.9 3.1 
Female 172 274 102 25.4 23.3 20.5 4.7 
Total 2,475 3,430 955 24.5 29.2 58.3 3.3 
% female 6.9 9.0 10,7 
Total Male 9,430 10,568 1,138 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.1 
Female 676 1,176 499 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.5 
Total 10,106 11,744 1,637 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.5 
% female 6.7 10.0 30.5 
Source: CAPMAS, Population Censuses. 
Table 5 - Distribution of Employment by Sector and Educational Attainment, 1988 
Educational Attainment (Age 10 and above) 
Sector below intermediat university Total 
intermediat e and above and above 
Row Percentages 
Government M 42.6 31.3 26.1 100.0 
F 5.3 63.1 31.6 100.0 
T 31.6 40.7 27.7 100.0 
Public Enterprise M 58.1 26.6 15.3 100.0 
F 21.3 55.4 23.3 100.0 
T 53.3 30.4 16.3 100.0 
Private Agriculture M 94.0 5.0 1.0 100.0 
F 98.8 1.2 0.0 100.0 
T 96.5 3.0 0.5 100.0 
Private Non- Agriculture M 80.0 13.0 7.0 100.0 
F 82.7 11.1 6.2 100.0 
T 80.5 12.6 6.9 100.0 
All Sectors M 75.0 15.4 9.6 100.0 
F 80.5 13.1 6.4 100.0 
T 76.9 14.6 8.5 100.0 
Column Perc entages 
Government M 10.5 37.6 50.3 18.5 
F 0.9 67.8 69.9 14.1 
T 7.0 47.2 55.6 16.9 
Public Enterprise M 7.9 17.7 16.3 10.2 
F 0.7 11.8 10.2 2.8 
T 5.3 15.8 14.7 7.6 
Private Agriculture M 43.3 11.2 3.5 34.5 
F 81.8 6.1 0.2 66.7 
T 57.6 9.6 2.6 45.9 
Private Non- Agriculture M 37.5 29.7 25.7 35.2 
F 16.4 13.4 15.5 15.9 
T 29.7 24.5 23.0 28.4 
All Sectors M 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
F 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
T 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Calculated from CAPMAS October 1988 LFSS. 
Table 6 - Distribution of the Unemployed and Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, Ages 12- 64 
Year Illiterate Reads Below Intermediate Above University All 
and Writes Intermediate Intermediate 
'000s 36 37 30 819 107 306 1,354 
1987 row % 2.7 2.8 2.2 60.5 7.9 22.6 100.0 
(December) tin. rt. % 0.4 1.5 1.5 31.8 19.8 18.8 7.4 
'000s 174 55 113 716 91 197 1,345 
1990 row % 12.9 4.1 8.4 53.3 6.8 14.6 100.0 
December tin. rt. % 2.6 1.8 12.7 23.2 15.4 12.3 8.5 
'000s 52 24 49 933 115 224 1,397 
1991 row % 3.7 1.7 3.5 66.8 8.2 16.0 100.0 
(Annual) pin. rt. % 0.8 0.8 5.6 30.2 19.3 14.0 8.8 
'000s 17 15 17 997 129 241 1,416 
1992 row % 1.2 1.0 1.2 70.4 9.1 17.0 100.0 
(Annual) tin. rt. % 0.3 0.5 2.1 30.2 20.1 14.6 9.0 
Source: CAPMAS, LFSS. 
Note: Below intermediate refers to primary and preparatory school graduates, intermediate refers 
to secondary school graduates, and above intermediate refers to technical institute graduates. 
Table 7 - Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in the Wage Equations 











voc. sec., blue collar 
voc. sec., white collar 
technical institute 
all bachelor's degrees 
bachelor of engineering 
postgraduate 
Region of Residence: 
Greater Cairo (reference) 
Alexandria and Suez Canal 
Urban Lower Egypt 
Urban Upper Egypt 
Rural Lower Egypt 























































All Private Public All 
-0.523 -0.955 -0.551 -0.644 
(0.664) (0.707) (0.591) (0.642) 
34.6 27.7 32.6 31.5 
(11.9) (10.3) (8.6) (9.2) 
16.8 6.8 10.5 9.7 
(11.9) (9.0) (8.7) (8.9) 
0.213 0.304 0.033 0.094 
(0.410) (0.460) (0.179) (0.292) 
0.182 0.060 0.014 0.024 
(0.386) (0.237) (0.116) (0.154) 
0.089 0.054 0.018 0.026 
(0.284) (0.226) (0.132) (0.160) 
0.089 0.088 0.025 0.040 
(0.285) (0.283) (0.157) (0.196) 
0.035 0.028 0.025 0.025 
(0.183) (0.166) (0.155) (0.158) 
0.058 0.071 0.014 0.027 
(0.235) (0.257) (0.116) (0.161) 
0.127 0.196 0.436 0.381 
(0.333) (0.398) (0.496) (0.486) 
0.043 0.037 0.143 0.119 
(0.203) (0.189) (0.350) (0.324) 
0.142 0.159 0.275 0.249 
(0.349) (0.366) (0.447) (0.432) 
0.021 0.003 0.013 0.010 
(0.144) (0.053) (0.112) (0.107) 
0.022 0.003 0.019 0.015 
(0.146) (0.053) (0.135) (0.122) 
0.322 0.520 0.353 0.393 
(0.467) (0.500) (0.478) (0.488) 
0.123 0.145 0.157 0.154 
(0.328) (0.352) (0.364) (0.361) 
0.149 0.105 0.195 0.174 
(0.356) (0.307) (0.396) (0.379) 
0.111 0.068 0.129 0.115 
(0.315) (0.252) (0.335) (0.319) 
0.188 0.125 0.125 0.125 
(0.391) (0.331) (0.331) (0.330) 
0.107 0.037 0.041 0.039 
(0.310) (0.189) (0.197) (0.194) 
0.662 0.281 0.673 0.583 
(0.473) (0.450) (0.469) (0.493) 
0.094 0.095 0.095 
(0.292) (0.293) (0.293) 
0.157 
(0.364) 
2,926 352 1,180 1,532 
' Refers to non-participation in non-agricultural wage work. 
Table 8 - Selectivity-Corrected Wage Equation Estimates, Males 













vocational sec., blue collar 
vocational sec., white collar 
technical institute 
university 
increment for engineering 
post graduate 
Region of Residence:2 
Alexandria and Suez Canal 
Urban Lower Egypt 
Urban Upper Egypt 
Rural Lower Egypt 
Rural Upper Egypt 
Public Enterprise 
Wage Work Selection - ai 





Single Selection Model Double Selection Model 
(I) (2) (1) (2) 
All Sectors All Sectors Private Public Private Public 
-1.287 *w* -0.833 *** -0.903 *** -1.630 *** -0.687 *** -0.933 *"* 
(-17.23) (-9.25) (-6.68) (-13.86) (-4.39) (-5.86) 
0.051 *** 0.024 *** 0.050 ** 0.042 *** 0.037 *** 0.008 
(15.25) (5.25) (7.10) (9.86) (4.31) (1.12) 
0.011 *** 0.009 0.009 
(3.94) (1.60) (2.53) 
0.023 *** 0.019 0.020 *** 
(7.72) (2.52) (5.53) 
0.024 * * 0.026 *** 0.024 *** 
(6.98) (2.56) (5.95) 
-0.080 *** -0.037 *** -0.097 *** -0.045 *** -0.071 *** 0.003 
(-10.26) (-4.04) (-6.55) (-5.07) (-4.03) (0.25) 
0.079 * * 0.046 -0.064 0.194 *** -0.081 0.150 +** 
(1.99) (1.18) (-0.93) (3.93) (-1.15) (2.98) 
0.162 *** -0.117 -0.002 0.290 *** -0.155 -0.022 
(3.52) (-1.64) (-0.02) (4.86) (-1.42) (-0.19) 
0.226 *** -0.059 -0.006 0.436 *+* -0.154 0.117 
(4.68) (-0.92) (-0.07) (6.58) (-1.50) (1.07) 
0.421 *** -0.034 0.070 0.769 *** -0.137 0.197 
(6.66) (-0.40) (0.63) (9.62) (-1.01) (1.57) 
0.572 *** 0.155 ** 0.187 * 0.785 *** -0.027 0.262 ** 
(9.07) (1.97) (1.72) (8.81) (-0.20) (2.16) 
0.407 *** -0.057 0.057 0.723 *** -0.191 0.187 * 
(7.56) (-0.74) (0.47) (10.83) (-1.25) (1.73) 
0.536 *** 0.074 0.145 0.863 *+* -0.069 0.312 *** 
(7.88) (0.86) (0.88) (10.69) (-0.38) (2.62) 
0.741 *** 0.268 *** 0.401 **w 1.056 *** 0.143 0.436 *** 
(14.12) (3.37) (2.93) (14.71) (0.87) (3.58) 
0.342 *** 0.354 *** 0.607 *** 0.182 ** 0.522 *** 0.226 *** 
(4.34) (4.60) (3.66) (2.27) (3.02) (2.74) 
1.064 *** 0.524 *** 0.811 *** 1.391 *** 0.184 0.742 *** 
(12.68) (4.77) (2.86) (15.01) (0.47) (5.30) 
-0.072 ** -0.072 ** 0.031 -0.143 *** 0.034 -0.166 *** 
(-2.00) (-2.04) (0.49) (-3.43) (0.52) (-3.86) 
-0.168 *** -0.156 *** -0.083 -0.183 ** -0.069 -0.195 *** 
(-4.70) (-4.46) (-1.29) (-4.34) (-1.03) (-4.54) 
-0.221 *** -0.198 *** -0.162 -0.163 *** -0.135 -0.183 *** 
(-5.66) (-5.17) (-1.99) (-3.52) (-1.59) (-3.92) 
-0.320 *** -0.258 *** -0.048 -0.360 *** 0.002 -0.377 *** 
(-7.76) (-6.27) (-0.55) (-7.05) (0.02) (-7.43) 
-0.313 *** -0.244 *** -0.011 -0.323 *** 0.041 -0.351 *** 
(-6.41) (-4.99) (-0.10) (-5.27) (0.37) (-5.78) 
0.245 *** 0.251 ** 
(9.30) (9.63) 
0.132 -0.023 -0.188 0.162 * -0.275 ** 0.124 
(2.03) (-0.34) (-1.57) (1.89) (-2.14) (1.47) 
-0.129 * -0.065 -0.094 -0.205 
(-1.65) (-1.17) (-1.17) (-3.01) 
0.231 -0.048 -0.274 0.354 -0.417 0.317 
-0.162 -0.186 -0.0819 -0.456 
0.278 0.297 0.218 0.446 0.226 0.459 
2926 2926 1232 1694 1232 1694 
Illiterate is the reference category. 
2 Grater Cairo is the reference category. 
Significance levels at the 1 percent level (***), 5 percent level (**) and 10 percent level (*) are indicated. 
Table 9 - Selectivity-Corrected Wage Equation Estimates, Females 






experience* tertiary education 
experience2/100 
Educational Attainment:' 




vocational sec., blue collar 
vocational sec., white collar 
technical institute 
university 
increment for engineering 
postgraduate 
Region of Residence:2 
Alexandria and Suez Canal 
Urban Lower Egypt 
Urban Upper Egypt 
Rural Lower Egypt 
Rural Upper Egypt 
Public Enterprise 
Wage Work Selection-X, 
Public-Private Selection - X, 

















































Pe i 0.017 
Pre 
R2 0.461 
Number of Observations 1,532 
Illiterate is the reference category. 
2 Grater Cairo is the reference category. 
(2) (1) (2) 
All Sectors Private Public Private Public 
-1.169 *** -1.702 *** -1.164 *** -1.444 *** -0.761 *** 
(-7.34) (-4.16) (-4.83) (-3.85) (-2.94) 
0.030 *** 0.025 ** 0.047 *** 0.012 0.020 ** 
(5.13) (2.09) (8.00) (0.93) (2.46) 
0.017*** 0.010 0.016 
(2.74) (0.82) (1.88) 
0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 
(8.04) (2.64) (4.48) 
0.020 *** 0.040 ** 0.021 *** 
(4.26) (2.08) (3.07) 
** -0.054 *** -0.035 -0.044 ** -0.012 -0.036 
(-4.22) (-1.13) (-2.54) (-0.39) (-2.04) 
0.003 -0.022 -0.088 -0.040 -0.046 
(0.03) (-0.10) (-0.52) (-0.22) (-0.25) 
-0.007 0.063 0.039 -0.014 -0.242 
(-0.06) (0.27) (0.25) (-0.07) (-1.12) 
0.033 0.059 0.195 -0.020 -0.063 
(0.33) (0.29) (1.25) (-0.10) (-0.28) 
0.274 *4* 0.424 0.470 *** 0.298 0.007 
(2.60) (1.56) (3.02) (1.20) (0.04) 
0.091 0.270 0.155 0.123 -0.245 
(0.70) (0.92) (0.80) (0.46) (-1.08) 
0.099 0.090 0.288 * -0.058 -0.132 
(0.86) (0.31) (1.70) (-0.22) (-0.64) 
0.170 0.047 0.360 * -0.057 -0.073 
(1.29) (0.12) (1.94) (-0.17) (-0.34) 
0.583 *** 0.875 *** 0.628 *** 0.657 ** 0.291 
(4.62) (2.71) (3.63) (2.20) (1.38) 
0.152 0.202 0.084 0.303 0.075 
(1.29) (0.57) (0.73) (0.59) (0.65) 
0.906 *** 1.278 *** 0.942 *** 0.826 0.628 *** 
(5.40) (2.72) (4.66) (1.31) (2.65) 
*** -0.125 -0.173 -0.153 *** -0.131 -0.171 *** 
(-3.49) (-1.36) (-3.63) (-1.15) (-3.97) 
*** -0.113 -0.429 *** -0.098 ** -0.360 *** -0.114 *** 
(-3.26) (-3.08) (-2.39) (-2.77) (-2.72) 
*** -0.177 -0.539 *** -0.150 *** -0.469 *** -0.176 *** 
(-4.39) (-2.91) (-3.13) (-2.81) (-3.59) 
*** -0.176 -0.355 ** -0.180 *** -0.308 ** -0.200 *** 
(-4.25) (-2.21) (-3.72) (-2.20) (-4.08) 
*** -0.240 -0.510 * -0.238 *** -0.455 * -0.280 *** 
(-3.57) (-1.88) (3.05) (-1.92) (-3.54) 
0.188 *** 0.196 *** 
(5.17) (5.49) 
-0.023 0.206 -0.075 0.145 -0.039 
(-0.41) (1.24) (-0.88) (1.01) (-0.43) 
-0.170 -0.252 ** -0.094 -0.323 *** 
-19) ( 2.41) (-0.90) (-2.82) 
-0.051 0.394 0.192 0.302 0.367 
-0.377 -0.475 -0.274 -0.67 
0.483 0.306 0.530 0.319 0.542 
1,532 352 1,180 352 1,180 
Significance levels at the I percent level (***), 5 percent level (**) and 10 percent level (*) are indicated. 
Table 10 - Predicted Wages by Institutional Sector and Sex, in LE/hr. 
Government1 Private Sector All Sectors 
Male Female Male Female' Male Female 
(1)2 (2)2 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Experience' 
5 years 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.22 0.27 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.46 
15 years 0.69 0.72 0.77 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.27 0.40 0.75 0.76 0.72 0.75 
25 years 0.88 0.96 1.04 1.10 0.83 1.08 0.30 0.57 0.91 1.05 0.94 1.10 
35 years 1.03 1.28 1.28 1.45 0.76 1.24 0.31 0.80 0.94 1.34 1.04 1.45 
Educational Attainment' 
Illiterate 0.34 0.44 0.58 0.58 0.69 0.75 0.24 0.28 0.50 0.57 0.53 0.43 
Read and Write 0.41 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.65 0.69 0.24 0.26 0.54 0.60 0.46 0.43 
Primary 0.45 0.50 0.60 0.58 0.69 0.73 0.26 0.32 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.55 
Preparatory 0.50 0.58 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.74 0.26 0.31 0.62 0.64 0.58 0.57 
General Secondary 0.72 0.73 0.92 0.90 0.74 0.87 0.37 0.57 0.76 0.78 0.86 0.89 
Voc. Sec. Blue Collar 0.73 0.78 0.67 0.70 0.84 0.97 0.32 0.48 0.88 0.94 0.69 0.74 
Voc. Sec. White Collar 0.69 0.72 0.77 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.27 0.40 0.75 0.76 0.72 0.75 
Technical Institute' 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.93 0.26 0.40 0.85 0.87 0.80 0.80 
Engineering Bacc. 1.16 1.23 1.18 1.14 1.90 2.13 0.72 1.31 1.47 1.53 1.22 1.21 
Other Bacc. 0.96 0.98 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.27 0.59 0.97 1.04 1.07 1.06 1.04 
Post Graduate 1.35 1.33 1.48 1.48 1.56 1.32 0.88 1.14 1.44 1.39 1.44 1.43 
Notes: 
'On average, public enterprise wages are 25 percent higher than in government for males, and 19 percent higher for females. 
'(I) and (2) refer to wage equation estimates without and with experience-education interactions, respectively, as indicated 
in Tables 8 and 9. 
'Using white collar vocational secondary graduates residing in Greater Cairo as the reference. 
'Using individuals with 15 years of experience and residing in Greater Cairo as the reference. 
`The wage equation coefficients for private sector females have large standard errors due to small sample size. 
Table it - Decomposition of Public-Private Wage Differentials 
Differential due to difference in 











(i) (ii) (iii) (ii)+(iii) (iv) 
y": - 7R males 0.058 0.271 -0.246 -0.123 -0.369 0.156 
(0.062) (0.223) (0.175) (0.153) (0.135) 
females 0.382 0.256 0.683 -0.058 0.626 -0.500 
(0.138) (0.456) (0.297) (0.294) (0.293) 
Y PE - Y R males 0.208 0.226 0.004 -0.134 -0.129 0.111 
(0.041) (0.224) (0.167) (0.147) (0.137) 
females 0.523 0.326 0.879 -0.100 0.779 -0.582 
(0.099) (0.459) (0.277) (0.307) (0.305) 
Note: G stands for government, PE for public enterprise and R for private. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Supply and Demand for Graduate Labor in the Presence 


















Figure 2 - Estimated Wage-Experience Profiles by Selected Educational Levels, 
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APPENDIX 
Specification and Estimation of The Selection Equation 
A.1 The Model 
Using the dichotomous variables D, and D2, the two selection rules for 
participation in non-agricultural wage work and sectoral selection can be expressed 
as: 
1 non - agricultural wage worker if I, > 0 
D' 0 otherwise if I; <_ 0 
DZ 
non - agricultural wage worker in public sector if I, > 0 
J 
1 
0 non - agricultural wage worker in private sector if Iz <_ 0 
where 1, and I, are latent variables indicating the difference in the worker's utility 
between non-agricultural wage work and other labor market states, and between 
public and private non-agricultural wage work, respectively.' The worker's utility in 
each sector takes into account both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of 
participation in each sector as well as non-competitive barriers to entry, which can 
take the form of waiting queues or other costs of entry. 
Omitting subscripts indicating a particular individual, the latent variables can 
be written as a linear function of observable characteristics and an error term as 
follows: 




where Z is a vector of individual characteristics, y, and 72 are vectors of unknown 
parameters, e, and £2 are zero-mean, constant variance disturbance terms. Since 
1; and I, are not observed, but sector selection is, this can be estimated as a system of 
two dichotomous dependent variable equations, with allowance for the two 
disturbances to be correlated. Variables included in Z include the usual human capital 
The decisions are not necessarily sequential. The methodology used allows for the 
two decisions to be carried out simultaneously. 
I 
variables, locational characteristics, variables related to household structure and 
family background, such as marital and headship status and father's employment 
status, and for women, the number of children of different age groups in the 
household, other family members' income and employment status, and the presence of 
other female caretakers in the household. 
The wage equations in the public and private sectors are specified according to 
the standard Mincerian human capital model, where log wages are assumed to be 
depend on human capital characteristics and regional labor market and cost of living 
differences as follows: 
yP =POP+J3 XP+ VP 
YR - $OR +Y RXR + V R 
(3) 
(4) 
where Xp and XR are vectors of characteristics for workers in the public and private 
sectors, respectively, Pop and ROR are the two intercepts, and (3 P and (3R are vectors of 
unknown parameters other than the intercept. The vector of disturbances 
U = (s1,E2, v1, vli)is assumed to have a multivariate normal distribution with zero 
means and covariance matrix E. With the usual standardization of the unidentifiable 
variances of the dichotomous dependent variable models, E is given by: 
I 1 P12 PIP 6P PIR6R 1 
P12 1 P2P 6P P2R 6R 
2 
PIP6P P2P6P 6P PPRaP6R 
LPIR6R P2R6R PUP6P6R 6R j 
The system of equations (1)-(4) and the covariance matrix can be estimated by 
Heckman-Lee type two-stage methods, keeping in mind that 6,,R cannot be identified 
because only one regime is observed for each person.2 
Because workers in the protected and unprotected sectors are not randomly 
selected from the population, the expected values of the wage equations' disturbances 
do not in general equal zero. The expected value of log wages in the public and 
private sectors are given by: 
E(yP)=Pop +J(3PXP+ E(VPIDI =1,D2 =1) 
=pop +NPXP +P1P6PAIP +P2P6PA2P 
(5) 
2 Two stage methods provide estimates for A, = p,6i (where i=1,2, j= P, R) rather 
than for p;, and 6ij separately. OLS estimation of the second stage results in incorrect 
estimates of the standard errors. The expression for an asymptotic covariance matrix 
is provided in Tunali (1986). The sample selection package in LIMDEP, which I use 
to estimate these models adjusts the standard errors accordingly. 
II 
E(YR) = POR +flRXR + E(vRIDI = 1,D2 = 0) 





R G(01; 82? P12) 
.f (021)F(01* ) 
2P - G(01,02;P12) 
.f (82)F(e1*) R - G(01, 02;-P12 ) 
(6) 
(7) 
where f(.) and F(.) denote the standard univariate normal density and distribution 
functions, respectively, G(. , . ; p) denotes the standard bivariate normal distribution 
function, with correlation p, 
e1=y1Z 




02 = y2Z 
* 02 - P1201 e2 - 
(-P2 )1/2 12 
For males, the determinants of participation in non-agricultural wage work are 
assumed to be age, education, headship status, region of residence, and father's 
employment status. Since educational specialization at the bachelor's level is linked 
to the likelihood of being in the liberal professions and therefore determine 
participation in wage work versus self-employment, I include a more detailed 
breakdown of educational specializations than is typical in the standard human capital 
models. I also distinguish between vocational and general secondary education. 
Despite its important role in the theory of labor supply, unearned income is omitted 
because of the absence of any information about it in the data set. Since participation 
in the labor force is virtually universal for males in the relevant age group, I consider 
males who have participated in the labor force during the reference year as the 
relevant universe from which selection occurs. Moreover, because information on the 
father's employment status is only available for a randomly selected subsample of 
about half the overall sample, the male equations are limited to that subsample. 
Since female labor supply is strongly dependent on domestic responsibilities, 
there are a number of additional variables that can be used as regressors in the 
participation in wage work equation for females, which is essentially a reduced-form 
labor supply equation. These include variables related to household structure, such as 
the number of children in various age groups in the household, the incidence of 
alternative care givers, and the presence of elderly household members. Whereas for 
males it is not reasonable to assume that the labor force status of other household 
members is exogenous, such an assumption is more easily defensible for females. In 
III 
the Egyptian context, it is unlikely that husbands, brothers, or fathers decide their 
labor force status in function of that of their wives, sisters, or daughters. It is 
therefore possible to include variables describing the employment status of other 
household members and their earnings in the female participation decision without 
worrying about simultaneity bias. Such variables include: "other household earnings 
from wages", which would be expected to be negatively associated with participation 
in wage work; "other private or public wage workers in the household", which should 
be positively associated because of the labor market information made available by 
other household members; "other self-employed workers in the household", which 
would be positively associated with employment in a family enterprise and therefore 
negatively associated with wage work. Since no data are available for earnings other 
than wage earnings, the effect of earnings from self-employment is captured by the 
variable "other self-employed workers." 
The specification of the sector selection equation is very similar for males and 
females. Because of the employment guarantee for graduates, education is expected 
to be strongly associated with participation in the public sector. Some educational 
specializations are also more likely to be employed in the public sector than others. 
Married individuals are also more likely to prefer the public sector, other things equal, 
because of their greater desire for income security. Identification of the male 
equations is done in a fairly ad hoc manner by omitting the dummy variables "father 
self-employed" and "head of household" from the sector selection equation, and 
omitting the variable "currently married" from the participation in non-agricultural 
wage work equation. These omitted variables were insignificant in the respective 
univariate probit models. The female equations are well identified. 
The parameter estimates for the selection equations are shown in Table A 1. A 
single selection model of participation in wage work for males and females is 
estimated first using a univariate probit specification (columns 1 and 4 in the table). 
These estimates are used to correct for selectivity the wage equation estimates that do 
not distinguish workers by sector. I also present the parameter estimates from the 
double selection model where participation in wage work and sectoral selection are 
estimated jointly using a bivariate probit framework (columns 2, 3 for males and 5, 6 
for females). These estimates are used to correct for selectivity the wage equations 
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